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Abstract
The foundation of the international effort to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (”NPT”). This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I proposes
a new Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Part II contains preliminary observations regarding the
Security Council, General Assembly and Zanger Committee provisions of the new treaty and then
addresses the basic question of why nations might be willing to scrap the established NPT in favor
of this new proposed agreement. Finally, Part III discusses how the advent of international institu-
tions and the increasing incorporation of international law into the framework of domestic, regional
and international tribunals may enhance the enforcement of the proposed non-proliferation treaty.
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WORKING TOWARD A LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE 
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME 
Ronald J. Sievert* 
INTRODUCTION 
An Honest Appraisal of the Ability to Legally Enforce the Apparent 
Commitments Made by the 1968 NPT 
The foundation of the international effort to stop the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (“NPT”).1 To be legally enforceable, however, a treaty 
must contain provisions that can be realistically achieved by the 
parties.2 Accordingly, in an effort to determine if the current 
NPT is enforceable, the first step must be to objectively analyze 
the wording of the treaty to determine if it contains reasonable 
objectives. 
There has been some debate in recent years over the actual 
meaning of the key provisions of the NPT. The non-nuclear 
weapons states (“NNWS”) maintain that, in essence, the 
“bargain” reflected in the treaty is that they will refrain from 
obtaining or developing nuclear weapons in return for assistance 
in acquiring peaceful nuclear energy and a promise that the 
 
* Professor, National Security and International Law, Bush School of Government, 
Adjunct Professor, University of Texas School of Law; Author: CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (2d ed. 2006). This material is based upon support from the 
US Department of Energy to the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute 
(“NSSPI”), Texas Engineering Experiment Station at Texas A&M University. Any 
opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication, 
however, are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the US 
Department of Energy. The author would like to thank Dr. Paul Nelson of NSSPI at 
Texas A&M for his substantial assistance with this Article. 
1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 
729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]. 
2. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 61–62, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT]. The United States has not ratified the 
VCLT, but it has been ratified or adopted by 110 nations, and it is generally regarded as 
customary international law for all states. 
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nuclear weapons states (“NWS”) will completely disarm.3 
Conservative advocates for the NWS, on the other hand, 
emphasize that the treaty only requires, on their part, a cessation 
of the arms race and a good faith effort at disarmament (with the 
possibility of even preserving some nuclear capability as a 
necessary hedge against aggressor states).4 Such good faith efforts 
could, theoretically, continue in perpetuity, but the fact that they 
have not achieved the ultimate goal of weapons elimination does 
not, in their opinion, in any way relieve the NNWS of their 
obligation not to engage in proliferation.5 
Legally, treaties, as contracts, are interpreted by looking at 
the ordinary meaning of the language with a supplementary 
reference to the surrounding statements of the parties when the 
language is somewhat ambiguous.6 Application of these basic 
rules demonstrates that the non-nuclear weapon states have the 
better of the argument as to the actual meaning of the NPT. The 
preamble to the NPT states the purpose of the treaty is to 
facilitate the “elimination from national arsenals of nuclear 
weapons . . . pursuant to a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament.”7 The treaty itself calls specifically for 
“negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating . . . to 
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament.”8 If there were any question as to the plain 
meaning of the words, at least from the perspective of the United 
States, it can be settled by resort to the statements of a succession 
of US presidents from Presidents Nixon and Reagan to President 
Obama as well as their advisors. They have verbally and in writing 
embraced the objective of immediate efforts to achieve complete 
 
3. See Adel Ali, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Its Recent Issues: 
A Legal Perspective, 1 INT’L J. NUCLEAR L. 305, 307 (2007); see also Chamundeeswari 
Kuppuswamy, Is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Shaking at Its Foundations? Stock Taking 
After the 2005 NPT Review Conference, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 141, 142–43 (2006). 
4. See Christopher Ford, The Nonproliferation Bestiary: A Typology and Analysis of the 
Nonproliferation Regime, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 937, 957–66 (2007); Paul Nelson, 
Book Review: Abolishing Nuclear Weapons by George Perkovich and James M. Acton, 3 ATOMS 
FOR PEACE: AN INT’L J. 143, 154 (2010). 
5. See Ford, supra note 4, at 960–62; Scott Sagan, Good Faith and Nuclear 
Disarmament Negotiations, in ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A DEBATE 203, 209–10 
(George Perkovich & James M. Acton eds., 2009). 
6. See VCLT, supra note 2, arts. 31–32. 
7. NPT, supra note 1, pmbl. 
8. Id. art. VI. 
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nuclear disarmament.9 Former US Secretaries of State Kissinger 
and Shultz have noted that the “[NPT] envisioned the end of all 
nuclear weapons” and have stated that states should cease 
reliance on such weapons.10 US Secretary of State Clinton 
proclaimed at the NPT Review Conference on May 3, 2010, “I 
represent a President and a country committed to a vision of a 
world without nuclear weapons . . . .”11 In the face of such fairly 
categorical pronouncements, any argument by the United States 
that the existing treaty really only required that it generally work 
towards some extremely far off objective of eventual 
disarmament rings hollow. 
Of course even if a general “good faith” effort was the only 
obligation under the treaty, it would be difficult to say that the 
United States has met this condition. Legally, “good faith” means 
“faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with 
the justified expectations of the other party” and not evading the 
spirit of the bargain.12 Based on such actions as the withdrawal 
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (“ABM”) Treaty and failure to 
ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (“CNTBT”), 
many could legitimately argue that the United States has not 
engaged in a “good faith” effort.13 This is not to make light of the 
thirty-year effort of the United States and USSR, beginning with 
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, to reduce their nuclear 
arsenals. The elimination of 13,000 nuclear weapons by the 
United States is an incredible accomplishment,14 especially 
considering that China has presumably increased its stock of 
weapons. But however laudable this achievement, it does not 
represent a practical commitment by the leaders of either the 
United States or Russia to actually abolish nuclear weapons. 
 
9. See, e.g., George P. Shultz et al., A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
4, 2007, at A15 (referencing Presidents Nixon and Reagan’s commitment to a nuclear-
free world); Lawrence Wittner, How Feasible is Obama’s Nuclear Disarmament Agenda?, 
HIST. NEWS NETWORK, Apr. 20, 2009, http://hnn.us/articles/76303.html (stating that 
Carter, Reagan, and Obama all called for “abolishing nuclear weapons”). 
10. See Shultz et al., supra note 9, at A15. 
11. Hillary Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks at the Review Conference of the 
Nonproliferation Treaty (May 3, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/
secretary/rm/2010/05/141424.htm). 
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981). 
13. See, e.g., Sagan, supra note 5, at 207–08. 
14. Ford, supra note 4, at 963. 
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Given that a possible interpretation of the wording and 
contemporary statements surrounding the passage of the NPT 
might require, at the very least, immediate efforts to achieve 
complete nuclear disarmament, it could even be charged, if the 
NPT was a legally enforceable treaty, that the United States, 
Russia, and other NWS are now in material breach.15 The Group 
of Non-Aligned States party to the NPT certainly seems to believe 
that this may be the case. Their Elements for a Plan of Action for 
the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, issued April 30, 2010, 
begins by citing the “multilaterally agreed commitments [by the 
NWS] to achieve general and complete disarmament” and states 
that “[t]he NWS need to implement the unequivocal 
undertaking that they had provided in 2000 so as to accomplish 
the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.”16 The United 
States would of course counter a charge of material breach by 
stating that its failure to eliminate nuclear weapons was caused by 
the refusal of other states to disarm, while they in turn would 
blame the United States. Such allegations would, in all 
likelihood, dissolve into an endless round of finger-pointing with 
no resolution. 
But the United States need not fear being forced to defend 
itself against charges of material breach of the NPT. This is 
because, to the extent the NPT manifestly requires an immediate 
attempt to completely abolish nuclear weapons, it has 
established, from a legal standpoint, an objective that in the 
current state of world affairs is impossible to achieve. A 
responsible government cannot disarm knowing that not only 
have its traditional adversaries been armed with nuclear 
warheads, but smaller unstable states, such as Iran, North Korea, 
and Pakistan, and non-state actors, have acquired or are hoping 
to obtain such weapons. Furthermore, as a nuclear weapon can 
be as small as an artillery shell and hidden in any house, shed, or 
cave, every practical world leader knows it is impossible to verify 
that a potential adversary has not kept any nuclear weapons in 
hiding; in the absence of absolute verification, the leader must be 
 
15. See VCLT, supra note 2, art. 60. 
16. INST. FOR SCI. & INT’L SEC., ELEMENTS FOR A PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE 
ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY GROUP OF THE NON-ALIGNED STATE PARTIES TO 
THE NPT 1 (2010), http://isis-online.org/uploads/conferences/documents/
NAM_Plan_of_Action_for_2010_NPT_RevCon_30April2010.pdf. 
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prepared to respond in kind. Secretary of State Clinton 
acknowledged this latter reality when she said in her May 3, 2010 
speech, “The United States will retain a nuclear deterrent for as 
long as nuclear weapons exist.”17 As no one will ever be able to 
conclusively prove the nonexistence of nuclear weapons, there 
will always have to be a deterrent. 
In addition, a solid case can be made that nuclear weapons 
have actually continued to prevent major catastrophic wars by, 
for example, deterring a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, a 
Chinese assault on Taiwan, or attempts by the Arab states to 
overrun Israel.18 NWS, like England, France, and the United 
States, that might wish to protect themselves and their allies 
against attack by larger states are simply not financially capable of 
permanently maintaining huge regular armies that can always 
deter a highly populous aggressor state by means of conventional 
weapons only. 
This author noted above that the objectives of the NPT 
could not be met “in the current state of world affairs” because 
theoretically one could imagine that the threats to security 
outlined above could be at least greatly reduced in a utopian 
future if all states were united in the creation of a UN that could 
actually prevent wars between states. This would require a 
Security Council (“SC”) that was not hamstrung by the veto and 
had established a record of acting quickly, without endless 
debate, to not only prevent aggression but capture and punish 
those who initiated aggressive war. Even this newly empowered 
ideal UN would need to possess nuclear weapons so as not to be 
at the mercy of a rogue state which had managed to conceal a 
few of its own. But at least such an organization would provide 
the cover that would enable states to disarm. Unfortunately, 
there has not been any attempt in the last few decades by the 
NWS and the NNWS to create this model international 
 
17. Clinton, supra note 11. 
18. See Heewon Han & Jongho Kim, How Hot?, ‘Real’ Hot: Can We Control North 
Korean Nuclear Weapons Through International Law? Hints from the International Court of 
Justice’s Advisory Opinion, 2 ATOMS FOR PEACE: AN INT’L J. 236, 240 (2009); Nelson, supra 
note 4, at 145 (citing Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; More May Be 
Better, ADELPHI PAPERS, Autumn 1981). The reference to Waltz is not meant as an 
endorsement of the theory that more weapons in the hands of more states is better. 
Such a development would contradict the basic principle that it is important to keep 
weapons out of the hands of a significant number of leaders. 
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organization. Such an organization does not exist and in all 
likelihood will not exist in the foreseeable future. 
What remains is a real world in which complete nuclear 
disarmament is impossible. The promise and hope of no 
nuclear weapons in the NPT is a fantasy. Despite the hard 
work of the delegates, and a strengthened International 
Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”), the decision at the 2010 
NPT review conference essentially to hold another meeting 
later to discuss the Middle East does absolutely nothing to 
alter this view.19 These statements are not meant to denigrate 
those who advocate the honorable goal of a nuclear free 
world. But, in this author’s ideal world, not only would nuclear 
weapons be eliminated, but also tanks, artillery, high 
explosives, automatic weapons, and many of the other terrible 
devices that have repeatedly caused horrific destruction in the 
last 500 years. An improvised explosive device or car bomb 
exploding next to a group of soldiers and civilians has the 
same devastating impact on them as a nuclear explosion ten 
miles distant. The world will not be able to completely abolish 
nuclear weapons, for the reasons already stated, any more 
than it has been able to eliminate “conventional” weapons. In 
the history of mankind, no weapon has just disappeared. Their 
use generally only diminishes when replaced by a more 
fearsome weapon; the clock cannot be turned backwards. 
Law generally has a way to accommodate reality. Article 61 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) 
provides that a treaty is unenforceable (by means of termination 
or withdrawal) based on impossibility of performance if an object 
indispensable to the treaty no longer exists.20 Article 62 of the 
VCLT states that a treaty may not be enforced if there has been a 
fundamental change in essential circumstances.21 If the party 
seeking to withdraw has caused the elimination of the object or 
the change in circumstances, it is still obligated by the treaty. The 
 
19. See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the 
National Security Advisor, General James L. Jones, on the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Review Conference (May 28, 2010), available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-
office/ statement-national-security-advisor-general-james-l-jones-non-proliferation-treaty. 
20. VCLT, supra note 2, art. 61. 
21. Id. art. 62. 
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indispensable objects and essential circumstances of the NPT are 
(1) the reduction and (2) eventual elimination of nuclear 
weapons states with (3) the assistance of a Security Council that 
would effectively act in response to reports of violations and 
diversion of nuclear materials by the IAEA.22 But the fact is that 
the number of nuclear weapons states have expanded since 1968, 
not reduced, and the Security Council has repeatedly 
demonstrated an inability to prevent more states from acquiring 
weapons. 
The refusal of some of the original NWS to completely 
disarm may have “caused” the other existing nuclear-armed 
states to retain their weapons. This did not, however, “cause” the 
additional proliferation and attempted acquisition of weapons 
that followed. France, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
and the USSR, were not serious enemies of India, Iraq, Israel, or 
Pakistan prior to 1990, and the major powers did not seriously 
threaten the sovereignty of North Korea. The development of 
nuclear weapons by four new states since 1968 with relative 
alacrity (not including Libya and South Africa which disbanded 
their programs), along with the reported efforts of non-state 
actors to obtain them, has legally subverted the foundation of the 
NPT and made it impossible for the original NWS to eliminate 
their own weapons. In addition, the United States and the United 
Kingdom, at least, certainly are not responsible for the failure of 
the Security Council to prevent proliferation. This body, despite 
the end of the Cold War, has been constrained by national self-
interest instead of empowered by the need to insure global 
security. Its weakness has been one of the great disappointments 
of our time. Regardless, its inability to be effective in the face of 
threats of proliferation has also completely undermined one of 
the core premises of the NPT. If a NWS were ever to be 
challenged before an international tribunal because of its failure 
to disarm, it would thus have a very strong legal case that the 
1968 treaty simply could not be enforced against that state 
because of impossibility of performance and fundamental change 
of circumstances. 
 
22. Ben Sanders, A Short History of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 62 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 7, 
18–19 (1998) (referencing the “basic measures that underpin the non proliferation 
regime,” discussing the IAEA safeguards and reporting requirements, and noting that 
the Security Council formally took responsibility for non-proliferation in 1992). 
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The promise of a world free of nuclear weapons in the NPT 
may be utopian, but the goal of no nuclear war is both possible 
and real. The way to reach this important objective is to fashion a 
legally enforceable non-proliferation treaty and regime that 
actually limits the number of leaders who possess nuclear 
weapons while providing the NNWS with the civilian energy 
many desire.23 President John F. Kennedy’s great concern was a 
world in which twenty-five states had nuclear weapons24 because, 
of course, the more leaders who have such weapons the greater, 
the danger that they may be placed under the control of a Hitler 
or genocidal chief of state who has no fear of Armageddon.25 
Accordingly, the world needs to work honestly to create a 
structure that insures there are “no loose nukes, no nascent 
nukes and no new nuclear weapons states.”26 Such a regime, 
based on a legally enforceable treaty reflecting twentieth century 
progress in international law, can be constructed. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I proposes a new 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Part II contains preliminary 
observations regarding the Security Council, General Assembly 
(“GA”) and Zanger Committee provisions of the new treaty and 
then addresses the basic question of why nations might be willing 
to scrap the established NNPT in favor of this new proposed 
agreement. Finally, Part III discusses how the advent of 
international institutions and the increasing incorporation of 
international law into the framework of domestic, regional and 
international tribunals may enhance the enforcement of the 
proposed non-proliferation treaty. 
I. A PROPOSED NEW TREATY 
This section outlines a proposed Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty that is both realistic and enforceable. The reader need not 
devote inordinate time to an analysis of every word in the 
proposal as it is well recognized that draftsmen and negotiators 
would spend hours if not months quibbling over every nuance 
and phrase before such a treaty was ever submitted for 
 
23. See Nelson, supra note 4, at 146. 
24. See Glenn Seaborg, Explosive Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1982, at sec. 7, p. 10. 
25. See Nelson, supra note 4, at 146; see also Han & Kim, supra note 18, at 237. 
26. Kuppuswamy, supra note 3, at 147 (citing GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR 
TERRORISM, THE ULTIMATE PREVENTABLE CATASTROPHE 140 (2004)). 
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ratification. What is important are the concepts. An enforceable 
NPT might look something like this: 
 
Article I 
 
Each NWS agrees not to transfer nuclear weapons to NNWS 
or encourage or assist them in the development of nuclear 
weapons as outlined in current Article I of the NPT. 
 
Article II 
 
Each NNWS agrees not to receive or manufacture nuclear 
weapons as outlined in current Article II of the NPT. 
 
Article III 
 
The parties agree that a committee similar to the current 
Nuclear Exporters Committee will be formed to reach a common 
understanding on (a) an evolving list of “proscribed material,” 
such as equipment or material especially designed or prepared 
for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable 
material; and (b) the conditions, procedures, and safeguards that 
would govern exports of such equipment or material in order to 
meet the obligations of Article IV. Each party agrees to accept 
and abide by IAEA safeguards as outlined in current Article III of 
the NPT. 
 
Article IV 
 
Each party agrees to facilitate to the fullest extent the 
transfer of information and technology for the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy as outlined in current Article IV of the NPT. Each 
party agrees that “proscribed material” may only be transferred 
and received under the conditions, procedures, and safeguards 
mandated by the Committee established pursuant to Article III 
or the IAEA. 
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Article V 
 
The parties recognize that the following states possess 
nuclear weapons: China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States. The parties 
agree not to engage in a nuclear arms race as understood in 
former Article V of the NPT. Nuclear Weapons States agree not 
to utilize nuclear weapons against any other state unless there has 
been (1) first use by the other state or a non-state actor assisted 
by that state, or (2) the other state has initiated a war of 
aggression as that term has been defined by the International 
Criminal Court with intent to temporarily or permanently occupy 
the territory of a recognized state in violation of the UN Charter. 
 
Article VI 
 
The parties agree that any factual or legal dispute as to 
whether a nation is transferring weapons technology, violating 
IAEA safeguards, acquiring weapons, refusing to facilitate the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy, or otherwise acting in violation of 
this treaty shall be first submitted to the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in the Hague unless an emergency would not allow 
time for arbitration. If arbitration fails, the aggrieved party may 
bring the case before the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) at 
which time the complaining party will have the burden of proof 
by a preponderance of the evidence to demonstrate the other 
party is acting in violation of the treaty or appropriate IAEA 
safeguards. 
 
Article VII 
 
The parties agree that if the ICJ finds that a party is acting in 
violation of the treaty or appropriate safeguards, the ICJ may 
order fines, sanctions, or other remedies in accordance with this 
treaty that it deems appropriate. The parties agree that any state 
upon which fines, sanctions, or other remedies have been 
imposed may appeal the findings of the ICJ to the General 
Assembly or Security Council which may by majority vote (a) 
reverse the court order or (b) increase or modify the fine, 
sanctions, and remedies. The order of the ICJ shall be 
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considered final if the General Assembly or Security Council has 
not taken action within thirty days. 
 
Article VIII 
 
If a party does not comply with the orders of the ICJ, 
General Assembly, or Security Council within a reasonable time, 
the parties agree that the Security Council may order appropriate 
action by majority vote. If a party has violated Articles I, II, or V of 
this treaty and the violations threaten international peace and 
security, the parties agree that the Security Council may order 
military action as deemed necessary if such action is authorized 
by a vote of at least ninety percent of the sitting permanent and 
non-permanent members of the Security Council. 
 
Article IX 
 
The parties agree that they will support the adoption in 
accordance with the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
of a proposal specifically stating that knowing, intentional, and 
deliberate violation of Articles I, II, or V of this treaty by a State 
party will constitute a crime under that statute and that 
individuals who violate or have responsibility for such violation, 
by being in a position to exercise control over or direct the 
actions of a state, may be prosecuted in accordance with the rules 
of that court. 
 
Article X 
 
The parties agree that they will support the adoption in 
accordance with the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
of a proposal specifically stating that knowing, intentional, and 
deliberate unauthorized transfer, or attempted transfer, of 
nuclear weapons or proscribed materials and technology by any 
individual to any individual or state will constitute a crime under 
that Statute. 
 
 
 
  
104 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:93 
Article XI 
 
No party may terminate or withdraw from the obligations of 
this treaty unless in accordance with the requirements of Articles 
60, 61, 62, and other relevant provisions of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, the application of which may 
be reviewed by the International Court of Justice. 
 
Article XII 
 
The terms of this treaty are not meant to be aspirational, but 
self-executing and shall be considered as such by those judicial 
and governing bodies called upon to interpret the treaty. 
II. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
AND SECURITY COUNCIL PROVISIONS AND MOTIVATION FOR 
NEW TREATY 
As a preliminary matter, this author readily acknowledges 
that proposed Articles VII and VIII, by not requiring a 
unanimous vote, reflect an effort to circumvent the fact that the 
Security Council has been in gridlock for years because of the 
ability of any one of the Permanent Five to veto decisive action. 
The result has been weak, lowest-common-denominator decision 
making at best. The exact terms of these provisions, however, are 
not absolutely critical, and they should not distract the reader 
from looking at the totality of the concepts mentioned in the 
proposed treaty. At the same time, they have been included 
because this issue should be seriously discussed in any 
negotiations on a new treaty. The international community has 
sought to find some reasonable alternative to the obstacles 
presented by the UN Charter’s Security Council veto provisions 
since the adoption of the first United for Peace proposal in 
1950.27 The terms of Articles VII and VIII of the proposed treaty 
are consistent with at least the spirit of the insightful 2004 UN 
Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
 
27. G.A. Res. 377(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Nov. 
3, 1950) (allowing the General Assembly to vote to take action when the Security 
Council has been unable, due to lack of unanimity, to assume its primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security). 
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Change, which noted that “the veto has an anachronistic 
character that is unsuitable for the institution in an increasingly 
democratic age.”28 Moreover, the idea of a Security Council 
agreeing to action in the narrow non-proliferation arena without 
a unanimous vote may not be as improbable as it might first 
appear. The Permanent Five are all nuclear weapons states and 
therefore are unlikely to be the targets of UN action for violating 
this new treaty. Finally, the existing UN Charter does not legally 
preclude these terms as the proposed non-proliferation treaty is a 
separate document and can include any provisions agreed upon 
by the parties. 
The new treaty also formally acknowledges in Articles III 
and IV the need for an organization similar to the current 
informal Zangger Committee, which serves as a faithful 
interpreter of the NPT by attempting to define specific items that 
can produce special fissionable materials or that should trigger 
safeguards if exported or manufactured.29 The treaty itself, of 
course, cannot contain a list because technology evolves. The 
Zangger Committee of thirty-seven states, many of which were 
originally nuclear suppliers, has endeavored to keep up with the 
technology and define potentially dangerous materials with the 
understanding that some of these may be exported with 
safeguards in pursuit of peaceful nuclear energy.30 The 
committee’s work has been repeatedly referenced favorably 
during the NPT review conferences with a consensus document 
in 1995 stating that “[t]he conference notes that the application 
by all States of the understandings of the Zangger Committee 
would contribute to the strengthening of the non-proliferation 
regime.”31 It follows that the proposed new treaty should 
officially authorize and incorporate such a useful organization. 
The larger question is why the NNWS should agree to this 
treaty when they have one that apparently promises 
 
28. High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility, ¶ 256, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
29. ZANGGER COMMITTEE and NPT, http://www.zanggercommittee.org/NPT/
Seiten/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 18, 2010). This is also known as the Nuclear 
Exporters Committee. 
30. Id. 
31. Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the 
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 3 IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/482 
(Aug. 23, 1995). 
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disarmament. The basic answer is that the NWS will never 
completely disarm for the many reasons already stated, and the 
NPT has no enforcement mechanisms to insure disarmament, 
non-proliferation, or peaceful uses of nuclear energy. What the 
NNWS get in this treaty is what may be most important to them: 
(1) a legal (versus rhetorical) promise of no first use with 
possible criminal punishment for violation; (2) a strong 
deterrent to an aggressive war designed to take over their 
territory by the suggestion that nuclear weapons may be used by a 
NWS for their defense in the event of such an invasion; (3) 
concrete steps to insure non-proliferation of weapons, backed up 
by enforcement provisions so that there is less likelihood that 
nuclear weapons may be acquired by an unstable neighbor prone 
to use them; and (4) a promise to facilitate peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy with the ability to obtain compliance by seeking 
redress through the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”), 
ICJ, UN General Assembly, and UN Security Council. In short, 
they would be exchanging an empty promise for enforceable 
benefits. The NWS, on the other hand, would get exactly what 
they want: a legal regime with clear procedures that could 
actually prevent proliferation. 
The NPT of 1968, and perhaps more generally the entire 
edifice often termed as the non-proliferation regime, disregards 
the fact that in the last century international law has developed in 
a manner designed to encourage compliance with international 
agreements and customary international law. These 
developments occurred with the advent of international 
institutions, some of which have been referenced above, and the 
increasing incorporation of international law into the framework 
of domestic and regional tribunals. The next section will review 
some of these improvements with an eye to how they may 
enhance the enforcement of the proposed non-proliferation 
treaty. 
III. ENFORCEMENT 
In his article on the 2005 NPT review conference, 
Chamundeeswari Kuppuswamy stated that the NPT is strong on 
law but weak on enforcement.32 The same might be said of 
 
32. Kuppuswamy, supra note 3, at 142. 
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international law generally. Over the years an extensive body of 
law has developed through the ratification of treaties, 
recognition of the customary practice of nations, identification of 
general legal principles, judicial and scholarly writings, and 
adherence to fundamental norms common to all civilized 
nations.33 But there is no judiciary with automatic jurisdiction 
over disputes or a powerful executive to enforce the law. One 
might wonder why states bother to comply with treaties and other 
forms of international law at all. The answer lies in a series of 
practical, and sometimes moral, judgments. Treaties contain 
benefits for both parties, and states generally will not enter into 
agreements with states that have a reputation for disregarding 
still feasible obligations that have been accepted in prior treaties. 
States that ignore treaties, customary law, general principles, and 
fundamental norms can become pariah states and suffer 
diplomatic and economic sanctions as well as internal pressure to 
make good on their promises and adhere to standards of civilized 
behavior. This is why England, in accordance with the 
requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
would submit to the judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights and pay UK£40,000 to the families of slain IRA terrorists,34 
why Russia paid US$300,000 to England after arbitration when its 
fleet accidentally and understandably shelled English fishing 
boats in the North sea during the Russo-Japanese war,35 and why 
Norway abandoned its claims to Greenland based on a casual oral 
commitment made by its foreign minister.36 
In addition, in limited circumstances in certain countries, 
international law may be incorporated into domestic law so that a 
state’s judiciary and law enforcement authorities may enforce 
international law at least within that states’ boundaries. Thus, as 
early as the Spanish-American war, the US Supreme Court 
applied recognized international laws of war to captured vessels37 
 
33. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1031, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
34. See McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1996). 
35. See Dogger Bank (Gr. Brit. v. Russ.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 403, 403 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 1905). 
36. See Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 
1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 55, at 158 (May 11). 
37. Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 712–15 (1900). 
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and later enforced domestically the general terms of a treaty 
intended to prevent discrimination.38 
But these principles, while helpful, obviously do not carry 
enough weight and global force to insure that states and 
individuals do not often violate international law with impunity. 
There have been, of course, innumerable violations of the 
Geneva Conventions,39 the Torture Convention,40 and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights41 that have never been 
legally prosecuted. The international community also never took 
decisive legal action against Saddam Hussein or his advisers as 
punishment for his 1980s nuclear program, attack on Iran, or 
invasion of Kuwait; against Israel for its 1981 attack on Iraq’s 
nuclear reactor; or against North Korea42 and Iran43 for their 
repeated non-compliance with the requirements imposed by the 
IAEA, despite the fact that all of these actions were in violation of 
specific treaties or the UN Charter. This lack of enforcement is 
due in part to that fact that the relevant treaties do not contain 
provisions which take advantage of the many significant advances 
in international law that have occurred in the twentieth century. 
The proposed new NPT treaty regime does exactly that. 
A. Arbitration 
Article VI of the proposed treaty requires that any factual or 
legal dispute as to whether a state is transferring weapons 
technology, violating IAEA safeguards, acquiring weapons, 
 
38. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924). 
39. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
l949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, l949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
40. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20 (1988), 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85. 
41. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
42. UN Declares N Korea in Nuclear Breach, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, Feb. 13, 
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2751509.stm. 
43. See Jacqueline Shire & David Albright, INST. FOR SCI. AND INT’L SEC., Iran’s NPT 
Violations-Numerous and Possibly Ongoing?, Sept. 29, 2006, http://www.isis-online.org/
publications/iran/irannptviolations.pdf. 
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refusing to facilitate the peaceful use of nuclear energy, or 
otherwise acting in violation of this treaty be first submitted to 
the PCA in the Hague unless there is an emergency that would 
not allow time for arbitration. As written, this is non-binding 
arbitration, meaning that the parties do not have to accept as 
final the panel’s findings but can seek redress through the other 
organizations mentioned in the treaty. 
The creation of the PCA was one of the most concrete 
accomplishments of the 1899 Hague Convention on the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes.44 The PCA has, for the most 
part, maintained a low profile since its founding and its work has 
been largely unrecognized.45 But in reality, the PCA can be, and 
has been in the past, an invaluable asset as a mechanism to 
unravel complicated disagreements as well as to provide time for 
rational thinking to prevail when there is an intense clash 
between states. In 1905, Great Britain’s animosity towards Russia 
turned into a clamor for war when the Russian fleet, as 
referenced above, mistook English trawlers for Japanese torpedo 
boats.46 But international agreement on a five-member 
arbitration board, inspired by the creation of the PCA, acted as 
an escape valve to divert public outcry.47 The panel sorted out the 
facts, dispelled rumor, and found an acceptable resolution.48 
More recently, in 1996 after war broke out between Eritrea and 
Yemen over possession of the Hanish Islands, the PCA served as a 
neutral arbiter to sift through the complicated history of the area 
and determine rightful ownership.49 It is not unusual for the 
parties to a treaty to foresee the potential for future quarrels and 
to include mandatory arbitration in the document’s basic 
provisions. Thus, when Libya signed concession agreements with 
Texaco and other oil companies in 1955, the documents 
contained arbitration clauses that were utilized to provide just 
compensation when Libya nationalized private oil properties in 
 
44. See PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, History, http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage.asp?pag_id=1044 (last visited Oct. 3, 2010). 
45. See MARK JANIS & JOHN NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND COMMENTARY 
273 (2006). 
46. See Dogger Bank (Gr. Brit. v. Russ.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 403, 403 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 1905). 
47. Richard Lebow, Accidents and Crises: The Dogger Bank Affair, 31 NAVAL WAR C. 
REV. 66, 70–73 (1978). 
48. Id. at 72–73. 
49. See Eri.-Yemen Arbitration, 40 I.L.M. 983 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1999). 
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1974.50 On a larger scale, the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) included various means to 
arbitrate nautical disputes under the auspices of the PCA,51 and 
the 1994 European Energy Charter Treaty contained similar 
provisions.52 These terms have resulted in approximately twenty-
four arbitration cases involving investors under the Energy 
Charter53 and referral of five major cases related to UNCLOS.54 
In light of the continuous disagreements pertaining to nuclear 
proliferation and civilian use of nuclear power, it only follows 
that the international community should routinely look to 
arbitration as a first step in addressing disputes that may grow out 
of a non-proliferation treaty. 
B. International Court of Justice 
Non-binding arbitration is theoretically an informal 
proceeding in which all parties seek to come together to find an 
equitable solution. When arbitration does not succeed, 
adversarial litigation often follows. Accordingly, Article VI of the 
proposed treaty is structured to permit the parties to proceed to 
the International Court of Justice if arbitration fails. 
The ICJ was established under the UN Charter in 1946 to 
interpret international law, serve as a fact finder, and assess 
reparations in cases involving disputes between states.55 The 
court may also give advisory opinions when requested by a UN 
organization.56 An important first step is for the court to acquire 
jurisdiction to decide a contested case. This can be obtained in 
advance by the general consent of the parties,57 by special 
agreement in a particular case or, as provided in proposed 
Article VI, over “matters specifically provided for . . . in treaties 
 
50. See Texaco Overseas Petrol. Co. v. Libya, 17 I.L.M. 1, *5 (Int’l Ct. Arb. 1977). 
51. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 287, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397; see also PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, Ad Hoc Arbitration 
Under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1288 (last visited Sept. 18, 2010). 
52. See The Energy Charter Treaty art. 26, Dec. 12, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 382. 
53. See ENERGY CHARTER, Investor-State Disputes, http://www.encharter.org/
index.php?id=213&L=l (last visited Sept. 18, 2010). 
54. See Ad Hoc Arbitration, supra note 51. 
55. ICJ Statute, supra note 33, art. 36. 
56. See id. art. 65. 
57. See id. art. 36(2). 
  
2010] A NEW NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME 111 
and conventions.”58 The ICJ has been fairly active since its 
inception, deciding such highly contested issues as sovereignty 
over the Channel Islands59 and drilling rights in the North Sea.60 
Parties to the NPT have recognized that the ICJ could 
potentially be an extremely valuable tool in any non-proliferation 
regime because “non compliance is a very grey area; it is not easy 
to decide what amounts to non compliance.”61 It is perhaps even 
more difficult to decide when one organization has been 
assigned the role of adjudicator and enforcer, as is the case with 
the Security Council in the NPT, as opposed to utilizing a 
completely independent judicial body like the ICJ.62 
Assigning the task of adjudication to the ICJ after an 
adversarial hearing necessarily raises the important question of 
burden of proof. One of the current problems in the NPT is the 
demand by some for absolute proof when it is often impossible to 
produce such evidence. As Perkovich and Acton state in their 
treatise on nuclear disarmament: 
Actually proving that a state has violated an agreement 
can be very difficult and often takes time, no matter how 
effective and well funded safeguards are. . . . Enhanced IAEA 
safeguards are unlikely to inspire enough confidence . . . 
unless the international community is willing to accept a 
considerably lower standard for assessing evidence, such as 
balance of probabilities rather than proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.63 
The burden of proof in civil cases is preponderance of the 
evidence, which is very close to the “balance of probabilities” 
referenced by Perkovich and Acton. Preponderance of the 
evidence is generally defined as meaning that the fact is more 
likely true than not true.64 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
only required in criminal cases that would result in the infliction 
 
58. Id. art. 36(1). 
59. See Miniquiers and Ecrehos, (Fr./U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17). 
60. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 
20). 
61. See Kuppuswamy supra note 3, at 147 (referring to the position of discussants at 
the 2005 NPT review conference). 
62. See Nelson, supra note 4, at 159 (citing George Perkovich and James M. Acton, 
Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Adelphi Paper 396, in ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A 
DEBATE, supra note 5, at 107–08). 
63. Perkovich & Acton, supra note 62, at 89–90. 
64. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1301 (9th ed. 2009). 
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of punishment upon individual human beings as opposed to 
general sanctions on corporate and state entities. Accordingly, 
the burden of proof for the ICJ that has been included in 
proposed Article VI is preponderance of the evidence. 
According to the proposed treaty, the ICJ may be overruled 
by a majority vote of the General Assembly or Security Council.65 
Military action that would directly impose physical punishment 
could only be authorized by a ninety percent vote of the Security 
Council. It is expected that each state in the General Assembly or 
Security Council would apply its own individual standards of 
proof before voting on these matters. Clearly, such a procedure 
would insure that severe punitive measures were not imposed 
without substantial, convincing evidence to justify such actions. 
The appeal and sanction mechanisms applied by proposed 
Articles VII and VIII are extremely important to the ultimate goal 
of enforcement. Currently, the UN Charter provides that ICJ 
decisions may be enforced by the Security Council, which means 
that if one of the permanent five members vetoes an action, the 
decision is not enforced. This was the case after the ICJ ruled 
against the United States for violating the sovereignty of 
Nicaragua.66 Because of this and the previous concerns expressed 
about the Permanent Five veto, the proposed treaty does not rely 
upon unanimous Security Council approval to secure 
enforcement of an ICJ judgment.67 The ICJ verdict is final unless 
the losing party decides to appeal to the Security Council or 
General Assembly. There is no lowest-common-denominator 
decision making. To discourage frivolous appeals, the GA and SC 
are authorized to not only overrule the ICJ judgment, but also 
increase the fines, sanctions, or penalties. If the decision is not 
overruled or modified by a majority vote of the GA or SC within 
thirty days, it then goes into effect. If there is non-compliance 
with the decision of the ICJ or modifications made by the GA and 
SC, the Security Council may then take non-military action by 
majority vote or utilize military force after a ninty percent vote if 
the parties actions threaten international peace and security. 
 
65. See supra Part I, art. VII. 
66. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 14, 147 (June 27); U.N. SCOR, 2718th mtg. at 51, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2718 (Oct. 
28, 1986). 
67. See supra Part I, art. VIII. 
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C. International Criminal Court 
Articles IX and X of the proposed treaty state that the 
parties will support the adoption by the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”) of amendments that make it an international 
crime to transfer, receive, or manufacture nuclear weapons or 
technology in violation of Articles I and II, to engage in first use 
of nuclear weapons in violation of Article V, or to participate in 
unauthorized transfer of nuclear material as outlined in Article 
X.68 These provisions are vital to the enforcement regime 
contained in the proposed treaty. Other commentators have also 
recognized the potential use of the ICC against “illicit 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and material”69 and first use of 
nuclear weapons.70 The utilization of the ICC and its associated 
criminal justice system is clearly the next logical step in anti-
proliferation efforts. 
The vision of a UN-sponsored International Criminal Court 
naturally followed from the success of the Nuremberg trials after 
World War II.71 By the late 1940s, however, politicization of 
virtually every UN effort, generated by the Cold War, prevented 
the creation of such a tribunal. Progress was not made until the 
conflict began to dissipate in the Reagan-Bush-Gorbachev era.72 
In 1989, the United Nations International Law Commission was 
asked to draft the Charter for the ICC.73 By 1998, the Rome 
Statute detailing the rules and procedures of the Court had been 
adopted.74 The United States had a major role in drafting these 
procedures, but because of conservative concerns about possible 
politically motivated prosecutions of US officials,75 the United 
States is not one of the 111 states that have ratified the Rome 
 
68. See supra Part I, arts. IX–X. 
69. Nelson, supra note 4, at 164 (quoting Perkovich & Acton, supra note 62, at 135). 
70. See Han & Kim, supra note 18, at 250 (quoting David Krieger, Nuremberg and 
Nuclear Weapons, NUCLEAR AGE PEACE FOUNDATION, http://www.wagingpeace.org/
articles/1996/00/00_krieger_nuremberg.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010)). 
71. Ron Sievert, A New Perspective on the International Criminal Court; Why the Right 
Should Embrace the ICC and How America Can Use It, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 77, 93 (2006). 
72. Id. 
73. G.A. Res. 44/39, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/39 (Dec. 4, 1989). 
74. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
75. Sievert, supra note 71, at 95. 
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Statute by 2009.76 The United States has reengaged with the ICC 
during the Obama administration, sending a delegation led by 
Ambassador Stephen Rapp to the 2010 negotiations on defining 
the crime of aggression.77 
The ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity78 “committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population.”79 In 
addition, the Statute provides for amendments dictating new 
crimes to be adopted by the parties seven years after the initial 
ratification.80 Currently, the Assembly of States parties is working 
on adding the crime of aggression or aggressive war to the list of 
substantive crimes.81 
The ICC incorporates the key Nuremberg principle that 
individuals, not just states as abstract entities, are responsible for 
the commission of international crimes.82 The concept of 
command responsibility is embedded in the proposed treaty by 
the language stating that individuals “in a position to exercise 
control over or direct the actions of a state” may be prosecuted.83 
The international community had applied these principles 
during the International Criminal Trial for the Former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) trial of Slobodan Milošević84 and the 
proceedings against Augusto Pinochet,85 and the ICC has carried 
them forward with the indictment of Sudan President Omar al-
Bashir.86 
 
76. United Nations Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XVIII/XVIII-10.en.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2010). 
77. Blake Evans-Pritchard & Simon Jennings, US Takes Cautious Steps Towards ICC, 
INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING, May 6, 2010,  http://iwpr.net/report-news/us-takes-
cautious-steps-towards-icc. 
78. Rome Statute, supra note 74, arts. 6–8. 
79. Id. art. 7. 
80. Id. art. 123. 
81. See Evans-Pritchard & Jennings, supra note 77; see also ROGER CLARK, THE 
REVIEW CONFERENCE ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1 
(2010). 
82. Rome Statute, supra note 74, art. 28; see also Sievert, supra note 71, at 93. 
83. See supra Part I, art. IX 
84. Marlise Simons, Milosevic Now Faces Genocide Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2002, 
at A10. 
85. Bringing the General to Justice, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1998, at 23. 
86. Marlise Simons et al., Arrest is Sought of Sudan Leader in Genocide Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 15, 2008, at A1. 
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Although the proposed treaty requires that the parties 
support the adoption by the ICC of a substantive law 
criminalizing the first use of nuclear weapons absent self-defense, 
it is arguable that the court may already have jurisdiction over 
such an attack. When asked for an advisory opinion about the 
legality of the use of nuclear weapons, the ICJ could not exclude 
their use in self-defense,87 but noted that many argue that 
otherwise “nuclear weapons would in all circumstances be unable 
to draw any distinction between the civilian population and 
combatants, or between civilian objects and military objectives.”88 
The ICC prohibits crimes against humanity, and under the rules 
of international humanitarian law, such indiscriminate killing of 
civilians is prohibited.89 Nevertheless, specifically including first 
use, along with unauthorized transfer, receipt, and manufacture 
of proscribed nuclear material and weapons as substantive 
crimes, will insure there is no dispute as to the illegality of the 
actions. 
When leaders understand they can be held responsible for 
their decisions by a body such as the ICC, there can be a major 
deterrent to reckless actions. Professor John Norton Moore and 
others have noted that abuses take place when “regime elites,” 
usually within non-democratic governments that are not 
controlled by the people, engage in aggressive behavior with the 
knowledge that there is no “system wide deterrence.”90 “Leaders 
can externalize the costs of their high-risk behavior by placing it 
on their own people and neighbors and internalize the benefits 
because there is no one to hold them accountable.”91 Because of 
the ICTY, Spanish and English Courts, and the ICC, Pinochet, 
Milosevic, and al-Bashir found that this is no longer possible. This 
is why it is critical that the proposed treaty take advantage of the 
opportunities created by the newly established ICC. 
 
87. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, 261–63 (July 8). 
88. Id. at 262. 
89. Han & Kim, supra note 18, at 248. 
90. John N. Moore, Toward a New Paradigm: Enhanced Effectiveness in United Nations 
Peacekeeping, Collective Security, and War Avoidance, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 811, 840–41 (1997). 
91. Sievert, supra note 71, at 86. 
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D. War of Aggression 
Article V prohibits the use of nuclear weapons unless in 
reaction to another’s first use or response to another state’s 
initiation of aggressive war in violation of the UN Charter.92 No 
one questions that nuclear weapons may be employed after they 
have been used by an adversary. Authorizing use in response to 
an aggressive war in which the enemy has not used nuclear 
weapons would be far more controversial. In this author’s 
opinion, however, a commitment never to use nuclear weapons 
to combat a conventional attack would essentially invite a state 
with a large population and army to invade another that has 
fewer resources. States that have acted in the past to protect 
others, like the United States in South Korea and Kuwait, would 
have to maintain a huge military to be able to counter states like 
China and Russia, which can deploy a million soldiers in an 
attack. As it stands today, the US military has been strained to the 
limit simply maintaining 200,000 troops in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.93 As noted earlier, nuclear weapons have very likely 
prevented wars and it would be folly to abandon that deterrence. 
Any policy statements to the contrary are asking for trouble.94 
There naturally would be significant debate as to what 
constitutes a war of aggression. The goal is to find words that 
would legally prohibit something like Hitler’s attack on Poland, 
Japan’s occupation of the Philippines and Southeast Asia, or 
Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, while making room for an allied 
invasion of France to reverse the consequences of Nazi tyranny; a 
US attack on Iraq based on violations of numerous UN 
resolutions and Saddam’s genocide against over 100,000 Shiites 
 
92. Id. at 127. 
93. See John D. Banusiewicz, Petraeus Explains Afghanistan Strategy, AM. FORCES 
PRESS SERV., Sept. 03, 2010, http://www.defense.gov//News/
NewsArticle.aspx?ID=60737; Alexandra Hemmerly-Brown, Iraq Reaches New Dawn, Ends 
Combat Operations, ARMY NEWS SERV., Aug. 31, 2010, http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/
08/31/44509-iraq-reaches-new-dawn-ends-combat-operations/index.html?ref=home-
headline-title5. 
94. See Clinton, supra note 11. Clinton’s statements come close to this assertion, 
noting that the United States’ Nuclear Posture Review determined not to use nuclear 
weapons against NNWS in compliance with NPT. At least this would not apply to China, 
North Korea, and Russia. 
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and Kurds;95 Israel’s attacks against Lebanon, and possibly even 
Germany’s moves into Norway and Italy in what some might call 
strategic self-defense.96 In addition, provision should be allowed 
for humanitarian intervention where needed in states like 
Rwanda and Sudan. 
This author believes the motivation for an attack should be a 
major factor in determining if military action amounts to an 
aggressive war. When one state invades another with intent to 
occupy it and exploit its resources, as with Germany’s attacks on 
France, Poland, and the oil fields of Eastern Europe, that is 
clearly aggressive war. The United States, however, has never 
demonstrated intent to permanently occupy and exploit Iraq and 
Afghanistan (and of course has sought to return those states to 
democratic self-governance as soon as possible). Accordingly, 
these actions should not be labeled aggressive war. It is 
recognized, however, that it is not always easy to determine intent 
at the moment of invasion. 
Fortunately, the ICC Review Conference in Kampala, after 
seven years of negotiation, recently adopted an international 
definition of aggression.97 Although perhaps not technically 
perfect, it is both practical and reasonable and can be utilized in 
interpreting proposed Article V’s provision permitting use of 
nuclear weapons in response to first use or a war of aggression. It 
provides that a state commits the crime of aggression when it 
uses armed force to commit acts of aggression “against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of 
another state or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations.”98 Two paragraphs of 
“understandings” annexed to the resolution then assert that this 
is meant to cover acts that by their “character, gravity and scale” 
 
95. Claus Kress, The German Chief Federal Prosecutor’s Decision Not to Investigate the 
Alleged Crime of Preparing Aggression Against Iraq, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 245, 261–64 
(2004). 
96. See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF WAR: TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 211–12 (1994). 
Germany maintained that the invasion of Norway was necessary to preempt England’s 
planned invasion of Norway to block iron ore shipments from Sweden to Germany. Post-
war documents confirmed England’s planned operations in Norway. 
97. See ICC Review Conference, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, ICC Doc. RC/Res.7, annex I, 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf. 
98. See id. at 2 (referencing provision 8bis(2)). 
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are “manifest violation[s] of the Charter.”99 This is followed by a 
list of acts in Resolution 3314 which qualify as aggression such as 
invasion, annexation, bombardment, blockade, and attack on the 
armed forces of another state.100 The proposed definition 
includes further conditions such as a finding of aggression by the 
Security Council in advance of ICC proceedings if the Security 
Council submits the charge or dismissal of proceedings initiated 
by the prosecutor or another State if the Security Council 
affirmatively moves to block the charges.101 Accordingly, where 
the complaint is referred by another State or the prosecutor on 
his own, a Security Council veto by one nation alone could not 
interfere with the proceedings. Prosecution for the crime of 
aggression can be initiated against those “in a position effectively 
to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State” if they were involved in “the planning, 
preparation, initiation or execution . . . of an act of aggression 
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”102 
Despite the challenges interpreting legal terms, it will not 
always be difficult to recognize an illegal war of aggression that 
justifies the use of nuclear weapons in response under the 
proposed new NPT. As Professor Roger Clark stated at an ICC 
conference on defining the crime: 
At Nuremberg and Tokyo there was no great need to define 
what was meant by aggression. It was sufficient to adopt 
something like Justice Stewart’s approach to dirty books. 
That is to say, we know that disgusting stuff when we see it, 
and in particular that is what the Germans and Japanese had 
done.103 
The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression will 
now, however, put what we may have been able to viscerally 
perceive when it happened in the past into black and white legal 
 
99. Id. annex III, at 6. Article 51 of the UN Charter authorizes use of force in self- 
defense and Article 55 calls for observance of fundamental human rights. 
100. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
101. See ICC Review Conference, supra note 97, annex I, at 3–4 (referencing 
provisions 15bis and 15ter). 
102. Id. annex I, at 2 (referencing Article 8bis (1)). 
103. Roger S. Clark, Delegate from Western Samoa to the ICC, Justice Without 
Borders: the International Criminal Court, in 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 90, 91 (2003). 
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terms that should be understood by all the nations of the world. 
The result will hopefully be to deter aggression by telling leaders 
that not only are their states subject to nuclear attack, but they 
personally are subject to criminal prosecution, if they engage in 
such military offensives against sovereign states. 
E. Self-Execution and Extraterritoriality 
Article XII of the proposed treaty states that the provisions 
will be “self-executing” as opposed to aspirational. This phrase is 
included to add another mechanism to assist in the enforcement 
of the treaty as it would permit domestic courts to implement the 
treaty within their jurisdiction. 
Although many states incorporate international treaties as 
the law of the land, some follow the US model established by 
Chief Justice Marshall in Foster v. Neilson to the effect that a treaty 
“operates of itself” only when it is clear that its terms do not 
require additional domestic legislation to activate its provisions 
for application by domestic courts.104 An excellent case 
explaining this concept is the decision of the Supreme Court of 
California in Sei Fujii v. California.105 In its opinion, the court 
analyzed the UN Charter to determine whether the Charter’s 
general non-discrimination provisions were self-executing and 
could thus be utilized by Japanese challenging the California 
alien land law.106 The Court stated: 
In determining whether a treaty is self-executing courts 
look to the intent of the signatory parties as manifested by 
the language of the instrument, and, if the instrument is 
uncertain, recourse may be had to the circumstances 
surrounding its execution. . . . In order for a treaty provision 
to operate without the aid of implementing legislation and 
to have the force and effect of a statute, it must appear that 
the framers of the treaty intended to prescribe a rule that, 
standing alone, would be enforceable in the courts. 
It is clear that the provisions of the preamble and of 
Article 1 of the charter which are claimed to be in conflict 
with the alien land law are not self-executing. They state 
 
104. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829), overruled on other grounds by U.S. 
v. Percheman, 31 U.S. 51 (1833). 
105. Sei Fujii v. California, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952) (in bank). 
106. Id. at 619–20. 
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general purposes and objectives of the United Nations 
Organization and do not purport to impose legal obligations 
on the individual member nations or to create rights in 
private persons. It is equally clear that none of the other 
provisions relied on by plaintiff is self-executing. Article 55 
declares that the United Nations ‘shall promote: . . . 
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion,’ and in Article 56, the member 
nations ‘pledge themselves to take joint and separate action 
in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of 
the purposes set forth in Article 55.’ Although the member 
nations have obligated themselves to cooperate with the 
international organization in promoting respect for, and 
observance of, human rights, it is plain that it was 
contemplated that future legislative action by the several 
nations would be required to accomplish the declared 
objectives, and there is nothing to indicate that these 
provisions were intended to become rules of law for the 
courts of this country upon the ratification of the charter. 
The language used in Articles 55 and 56 is not the type 
customarily employed in treaties which have been held to be 
self-executing and to create rights and duties in individuals. 
 . . . .  
It is significant to note that when the framers of the 
charter intended to make certain provisions effective without 
the aid of implementing legislation they employed language 
which is clear and definite and manifests that intention. For 
example, Article 104 provides: ‘The Organization shall enjoy 
in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as 
may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the 
fulfillment of its purposes.’ Article 105 provides: ‘1. The 
Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its 
Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for 
the fulfillment of its purposes. 2. Representatives of the 
Members of the United Nations and officials of the 
Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and 
immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of 
their functions in connection with the Organization.’ In 
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Curran v. City of New York, these articles were treated as 
being self-executory.107 
There is a potential conflict between proposed Article IV of 
the proposed “self-executing” treaty in which the parties agree to 
“facilitate to the fullest extent the transfer of technology for the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy”108 and the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 that requires Congress to approve all such transactions after 
being assured of safeguards.109 If there is an actual conflict, a self-
executing treaty would prevail under the last in time rule.110 In 
practice, however, as the transfer would only take place in 
accordance with the conditions, procedures, and safeguards 
mandated by the new Nuclear Export Committee and the IAEA, 
it is expected that the basic technical conditions required by 
Congress will be met. On the other hand, a self-executing treaty 
may eliminate Congress’s ability to refuse to provide peaceful 
technology simply because it does not view a foreign state as 
cooperative or as an ally. 
Not all states adhere to a view of treaty law that requires a 
demonstrated intent that an international agreement be self-
executing before its terms can become operational in a domestic 
court. Germany, for example, follows a “systemic approach,” 
which, according to Eyal Benvenisti, 
has been particularly helpful in constructing a global world 
view of law that delimits national sovereignty and governs 
inter-state relations. . . . The systemic view organizes . . . legal 
obligations arranged within a certain hierarchy and legal 
coherence. . . . A recent trend in international law 
scholarship, particularly in the United States, challenges this 
view, offering international law as no more than a mix of 
solitary treaties hovering over the abyss of international 
anarchy with no particular hierarchy. . . . Under this view, 
state sovereignty reigns supreme.111 
It is because of the competing views reflected in Benvenisti’s 
reference to the US approach that it is important to make clear 
that the terms of the proposed treaty are intended to be self-
 
107. Id. at 620–22 (citations omitted). 
108. See supra Part I, art. IV. 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (2009). 
110. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). 
111. Eyal Benvenisti, The Conception of International Law as a Legal System, 50 
GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 393, 394–95 (2007). 
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executing. All domestic courts may then enforce its provisions in 
matters that fall within their jurisdiction without further 
implementing legislation. 
It is interesting to observe that the jurisdiction of domestic 
courts is not necessarily confined to what occurs within that 
state’s boundaries but may be applied extraterritorially.112 Under 
the “effects” doctrine, a state “may impose liabilities, even upon 
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders 
that has consequences within its borders.”113 Pursuant to “passive 
personality” jurisdiction, a state may punish acts that injure its 
citizens who are outside its territory.114 The “protective principle” 
allows a state to address conduct outside its territory that 
threatens its security or governmental operations.115 Finally, the 
doctrine of universal jurisdiction allows a state to take action to 
punish certain crimes against mankind regardless of the 
nationality of the victims or effect on the state. This has been 
applied to genocide, war crimes, torture,116 piracy, and acts of 
terrorism.117 Potentially violations of the new NPT might easily fit 
within one of these categories of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
Cases can generally be brought before domestic courts by 
any party that has standing because it has suffered injury as a 
result of violations of the treaty, though the rules of standing vary 
in each state. There would probably be a significant number of 
plaintiffs who could conceivably claim injury as a result of 
violations of the new NPT. One trend that could be effective in 
enforcing aspects of the proposed NPT is the recent recognition 
in Europe of non-governmental organizations, such as Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International, as parties who have 
standing in lawsuits. This is because of their role as (self-
appointed) guardians of certain constituencies.118 Regardless of 
the status of the plaintiff, the goal is an NPT that is enforceable. 
The combination of a self-executing treaty with effects, passive 
 
112. See JANIS & NOYES, supra note 45, at 778–79. 
113. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), 
superseded by statute, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2009). 
114. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 31 (Sept. 7). 
115. See United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 
U.S. 936 (1968). 
116. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239–40 (2d Cir. 1998). 
117. United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673, 681–82 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
118. See Philippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community and International Law, 30 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 393, 394 (1989). 
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personality, protective, and universal jurisdiction has unlimited 
potential to create new forums to insure the treaty is enforced. 
CONCLUSION 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 includes as a 
fundamental part of the bargain between nuclear and non-
nuclear weapons states a promise to abolish nuclear weapons. 
Realistically, the United States and other nuclear weapons states 
will never completely meet this commitment. As long as it has not 
been met, the non-nuclear weapons states will have an excuse to 
engage in activities that lead to proliferation. The goal should be 
no loose nukes, no nascent nukes, no new nuclear weapons 
states, and no use of nuclear weapons. This can be accomplished 
by drafting an honest new treaty that recognizes the reality that at 
least some of the nuclear weapons states will always maintain a 
certain number of nuclear weapons, while promising no first use 
absent aggression and guaranteeing the development of peaceful 
nuclear energy. Most importantly, this treaty can be constructed 
in a way that it can be actually enforced through reliance on 
mechanisms that have evolved in twentieth century international 
law such as the PCA, ICJ, and ICC, combined with modifications 
to insure in this realm an effective General Assembly and Security 
Council. The world should not continue to provide lip service to 
the false promises of the 1968 NPT, nor can it afford to 
complacently tolerate in this area a largely ineffective United 
Nations. This Article presents concrete ideas that could establish 
a clear, realistic path towards non-proliferation. This author 
hopes they will serve as the basis for productive discussions in the 
future that will lead to an enforceable non-proliferation regime. 
